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 I. Introduction 
 
Medicaid is one of several major components of the nation's health care system.  
It has grown dramatically over time and now provides health benefits for approximately 
52 million people, about one-sixth of the national population.  A program of this 
magnitude touches on all aspects of economic life, affecting beneficiaries, health-care 
providers, private insurers, taxpayers, and every level of government.  In particular, 
Medicaid has become a major expenditure item for state governments, with Medicaid 
spending of more than $230 billion in 2003, accounting for more than 15% of total state 
government spending in the nation as a whole.  A large fraction of state Medicaid 
spending is financed by grants from the Federal government, and these grants are now 
major elements in the system of Federal transfers to the states.   
The present discussion examines the Medicaid program from a fiscal perspective, 
especially with reference to the fiscal systems of state governments.  The steady growth 
of Medicaid spending raises questions about fiscal sustainability.  The states experienced 
a period of significant fiscal stress beginning in 2000, partly the consequence of 
weakened revenue flows and partly the result of earlier growth in expenditures.  Revenue 
growth has since increased, but perhaps this offers only a temporary respite before the 
next economic downturn triggers another round of fiscal crises.  Ominous demographic 
and other trends suggest that health care costs will continue to grow for decades to come.  
Will states be able to cope with the fiscal burden of Medicaid? Rising health care and 
other costs will subject the Federal government to fiscal stress as well.  Will the states 
  1find the Federal government less willing in the future to share in the financial burden of 
Medicaid?   
Lacking a crystal ball with which to provide definitive answers to these and other 
forward-looking policy questions, it is tempting to retreat to a cautious review of past 
trends and policy experience.  However, while it is not our purpose to engage in 
demographic, economic, fiscal, or political forecasting, it seems useful nonetheless to 
discuss, even if only in somewhat speculative terms, some of the policy options that the 
nation will face in the coming years. 
We begin, in Section II, with an overview of Medicaid spending from the 
viewpoint of its impact on state budgets, describing its growth in aggregate terms and 
also the wide interstate variation in Medicaid spending.  In Section III, we summarize 
some recent analytical efforts to explain observed Medicaid expenditures.  Because the 
Federal government plays such a large role in the Medicaid program, through its 
financing of state expenditures and through its regulation of the program, we focus 
particularly on the Federal regulatory and fiscal determinants of Medicaid spending.  We 
also present some preliminary results from ongoing research, highlighting possible 
interactions between the 1996 welfare reform and recent Medicaid spending growth.   
Section IV discusses the prospects for Medicaid in coming decades.  
Demographic change is likely to play a major role in the evolution of health care 
spending in the nation as a whole and may have very important effects on Medicaid in 
particular.  The future of Medicaid in state budgets will also depend crucially on Federal 
government policies, such as the recently-instituted prescription drug coverage provided 
by Medicare, Part D.  Recognizing that the Federal government faces growing fiscal 
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Federal/state division of labor in providing and financing health care benefits for the 
poor, the elderly, and for other groups.  We therefore discuss, in an admittedly somewhat 
speculative spirit, the implications of a policy reform for Medicaid similar to the welfare 
reform of a decade ago.  Section V concludes with a brief summary. 
 
II.  Medicaid Growth and State Government Finances, 1988-2003 
The rapid growth of Medicaid spending is well-known and widely documented.  
Here, we offer a concise review of this growth, mainly from the perspective of its 
implications for state government finances and intergovernmental fiscal relations.
1  We 
will frequently compare it to the major “cash welfare” programs – Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) prior to the 1996 welfare reform (the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA) and Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) subsequent to it.  This comparison is of interest for 
at least two reasons.  First, both Medicaid and cash welfare have been broadly targeted at 
low-income households, and indeed they constitute two of the largest and most durable 
means-tested transfer programs in US history.  Second, in both cases, a large proportion 
of state government spending has been financed by transfers from the Federal 
government.  Prior to the 1996 welfare reform, the structure of intergovernmental 
transfers for both programs was substantially the same:  the Federal government provided 
each state with open-ended matching grants for both programs, with matching rates 
varying among the states inversely to state per capita income, subject to a minimum 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion on programmatic development in the Medicaid program, see Gruber 
(2003). McGuire and Merriman (2006) provide a thorough discussion of how state spending on social 
assistance programs varies over the business cycle. 
  3Federal share of 50%.  The welfare reform replaced the matching grants for welfare by a 
system of lump-sum grants similar in amount to those previously awarded, while leaving 
matching grants for Medicaid unaffected.  Comparison of these two programs provides a 
unique opportunity to study the response of state governments to changes in 
intergovernmental grants.  
Table 1A summarizes some of the key trends in Medicaid spending since 1988.  
Medicaid spending now amounts to approximately 17% of aggregate state government 
spending, this share having approximately doubled in the past 15 years (column 3).  The 
rate of growth varies somewhat over time and by state, but the overall trend is 
unmistakably and almost monotonically upward (see Figure 1).  This may be compared 
with cash welfare spending, which was about 3.4% of state spending in 1988 but which 
fell to only 1.9% by 2003 (column 4).  At its inception in 1967, Medicaid and welfare 
spending were approximately equal in amount, but Medicaid spending has grown 
substantially faster over time.  By 1988, Medicaid spending was nearly three times as 
large as cash welfare spending, and by 2003, it was nearly nine times as large (column 5).   
Medicaid spending varies substantially among the states, as is illustrated in Table 
1B.  In 2003, two states (Hawaii and Wyoming) spent slightly less than 10% of their 
budgets on Medicaid.  At the top end, Medicaid spending exceeded 20% of the state 
budgets for five states (Missouri, Rhode Island, Tennessee, New York, and, finally, 
Maine – at more than 30%, the highest of all of the states) (column 3).  Cash welfare 
spending also varies widely by state, with seven states (Arizona the lowest, at 0.45%) 
spending less than 1% of their budgets on TANF in 2003, while three (Rhode Island, 
California, and New York) spent more than 2.5% (column 4).  Although New York 
  4stands out for high spending on both programs, California, which has the second-highest 
TANF expenditure share, is ninth from the bottom in Medicaid spending as a share of the 
state budget, and the simple correlation between expenditure shares on Medicaid and 
TANF spending, as shares of total state spending, is only 0.14.  Thus, simple 
generalizations about state “generosity” toward welfare and Medicaid beneficiaries, 
based on this metric, are unlikely to withstand scrutiny.  
As noted, intergovernmental transfers have played a critical role in the financing 
of Medicaid and cash welfare programs.  In 2003, Medicaid matching rates
2 were at the 
matching-rate floor of 50% in a dozen states but exceeded 75% in West Virginia and 
Mississippi (Table 1B, column 6).  Prior to welfare reform, matching rates for AFDC 
exhibited similar variation among the states, but these “matching rates” all fell to zero 
after 1996.  Given the large size and rapid growth of state Medicaid spending and given 
the high matching rates for this program, it is not surprising that Federal transfers for 
Medicaid are a major source of revenue for state governments.  As a proportion of 
aggregate state government spending, Table 2A, column 2 shows that Federal Medicaid 
grants have risen from about 5.6% in 1988 to nearly 10% in 2003, making these grants 
one of the main sources of revenue for state governments.  (By comparison, state 
individual income taxes and general sales taxes each brought in about 15% of total state 
government revenue in 2003.)  The role of Federal grants for cash welfare in state 
revenue systems, on the other hand, has declined steadily over time. In 1988, AFDC 
                                                 
2 We shall abuse terminology somewhat in speaking of “matching rates” when referring to the Federal 
government share of state spending.; thus, for instance, by “a matching rate of 75% (or 0.75)” we mean that 
the Federal government pays 75% of each dollar of state expenditures – what in more “classical” usage 
might be called a “3 to 1 match.”  
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(column 3).   
Table 2B, column 2 shows that the amount of revenue derived from Medicaid 
grants exceeded 5% of 2003 total expenditures in all states (Virginia, at 5.5%, was the 
lowest), while these grants exceeded 15% of spending for two states, Tennessee (16.8%) 
and Maine (20.5%).  TANF grants, by contrast, were comparatively insignificant, with 
amounts ranging from a minimum of 0.26% of total state expenditures in Arizona to 
1.8% in California and 2.2% in New York; aside from these last two, the corresponding 
figure was less than 1.5% in all other states (column 3).  
Finally, it is interesting to note that intergovernmental transfers of all types 
increased from about 22% of state spending to 27% in 2003; most of this increase 
occurred prior to 1993, with intergovernmental transfers remaining fairly steady as a 
share of state spending since that time, at about 25-26% (Table 3A, column 2).  There is 
substantial interstate variation in this figure, however: in 2003, it ranged from a low of 
15.7% (Massachusetts) to a high of 55.1% (Wyoming) (Table 3B, column 2).  Table 3A, 
column 3 shows that Medicaid grants account for a rising proportion of fiscal transfers to 
the states; having increased from about 25% to over 36% of all intergovernmental grants 
between 1988 and 2003.  AFDC assistance accounted for about 8.5% of all Federal grants 
to the states in 1988, but this share has dwindled over time to less than 4.5% in 2003 
(column 4).  For Wyoming, Medicaid grants constituted only 11% of all 
intergovernmental transfers in 2003, but were more than 50% of intergovernmental 
revenues for three states – Florida (51%), Massachusetts (62%), and Maine (67%) (Table 
3B, column 3).  
  6To summarize these observations, Medicaid spending has increased dramatically 
as a share of state government expenditures in the past two decades.  It now constitutes a 
major expenditure item for all states, but there is nonetheless wide variation among the 
states.  Medicaid grants from the Federal government defray a large portion of Medicaid 
spending costs for every state, both on average and, because of matching provisions, at 
the margin: each dollar of Medicaid costs states at most $0.50 and as little as $0.24.  
Medicaid grants have become a revenue mainstay for state governments, though there is 
again wide interstate variation in this respect, and these grants now constitute one of the 
major elements in the system of Federal fiscal support for the states.  In all of these 
respects, cash welfare programs present a marked contrast.  Federal support of state cash 
assistance to the poor long antedates state Medicaid programs (the Aid to Dependent 
Children program, a predecessor of AFDC and TANF, was first established during the 
Great Depression).  For many years, AFDC spending by states was supported, as 
Medicaid has been since its inception, with open-ended matching grants, but these 
matching grants were replaced in 1996 with a system of block grants.  AFDC and now 
TANF expenditures have been declining as a share of state government spending and are 
now almost an order of magnitude smaller than Medicaid expenditures.  
 
III.  Medicaid Spending and Federal/State Policy Interactions 
What can account for the observed growth of Medicaid spending and its variation 
among states?  This basic question is of crucial importance both from the viewpoint of 
budgetary planning and forecasting and from the viewpoint of policy analysis.  Changes 
in medical technology, the prices of pharmaceutical drugs, and other “supply” factors 
clearly affect the cost of health care and thus must be important expenditure 
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generally and Medicaid spending in particular.  Since much health care spending occurs 
late in life, for instance, the age structure of the population is certain to be an important 
spending determinant.  Medicaid benefits are means tested: eligibility for Medicaid 
depends on a potential beneficiary’s income and asset holdings.  Thus, income variations 
among states or over time are likely to influence Medicaid spending.  A number of other 
demand and supply factors may plausibly be conjectured to influence Medicaid spending.  
From the perspective of public finance, it is important to recognize that Medicaid 
is only one category of state government spending and that it competes with other types 
of spending for scarce budgetary resources.  The determination of the size and 
composition of sub-national government budgets has often been analyzed using some 
variant of the median voter model, as pioneered by such authors as Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973).  These models are helpful in highlighting the effects of the 
fundamental budget constraints facing a jurisdictions residents and policymakers.  In 
particular, household and government constraints depend on the incomes of state 
residents, but may be significantly affected by Federal grants, tax policies, and 
regulations.  The effects of past or prospective policy reforms can be studied by 
analyzing how they alter the constraints, incentives, and, ultimately, expenditure and tax 
policies chosen by policymakers. 
We have already discussed the role of matching grants in Medicaid financing.  
However, Medicaid grants are subject to significant regulatory controls that affect the 
types of households and medical expenditures that are eligible for financial support.  In 
order to limit Medicaid benefits to “poor” households, the Federal government has 
  8generally required states to impose means tests based on income and assets.  In addition, 
regulations have restricted eligibility based on age (for instance, some beneficiaries 
qualify by virtue of their participation in the Federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
program, which provides cash benefits to the elderly poor), health status (e.g., disability) 
or other individual or household attributes.  The regulatory structure of Medicaid has 
varied over time; as Gruber (2000, p. 5) characterizes the evolution of Medicaid during 
the period 1987—2000, “[t]he pattern of legislative action … was one of initial federal 
permission for states to expand their programs, followed within a period of several years 
by federal mandates to cover [various beneficiary]  groups.”   
Many of the determinants of Medicaid spending, such as the age structure of the 
population, the level and distribution of income, or the rate of technological progress in 
the health care sector, are only indirectly influenced by state or Federal policies.  From 
the viewpoint of potential policy reforms, the impact of Federal financing and regulatory 
policies on Medicaid spending are of particular interest because they may provide a much 
more direct mechanism through which to influence state government spending.  Several 
studies have shed considerable light on this issue.  
As is reported in Chernick (2000), both Granneman (1983) and Chernick (1999) 
attempt to estimate a matching rate (or own price) elasticity of demand for state Medicaid 
expenditures.  Granneman (1983) uses data from 1977 to 1980 and finds a matching rate 
elasticity of 0.78.  Using a longer time series of data between 1983 and 1995, Chernick 
(1999) finds a matching rate elasticity of .65.
3  In addition, Chernick (1999) reports a 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Chernick (2000) surveys several studies that have attempted to estimate the matching rate 
(or own price) elasticity of demand for AFDC/TANF and concludes that “… the fiscal impact of matching 
grants for cash assistance is negligible, suggesting that even very deep price subsidies are incapable of 
eliciting a an expansion in cash transfers to low income families.”   
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AFDC recipients (whose enrollment in Medicaid is mandatory).  This cross-price effect is 
somewhat at odds with the finding presented in Kousser (2002) that states exercise more 
discretion over expenditures on optional Medicaid enrollees.  Finally, Baicker (2001) 
analyzes the impact of mandated Medicaid expansions during the late 1980s and finds 
that states responded to these mandates by increasing Medicaid expenditures, while at the 
same time reducing other welfare expenditures by almost exactly the same amount.    
In a recent theoretical analysis (Marton and Wildasin (2007)),  we build a stylized 
model to study how Federal grant policies may affect state government spending on cash 
and health programs that benefit low-income households. In that model, state 
expenditures are financed either by state taxes on high-income residents or by grants 
from a higher-level government.  High-income households are postulated to benefit from 
cash and in-kind transfers to poor residents because they value both the well-being 
(utility) of the poor and their health.  In their preference structures, which are respected 
by policymakers, state expenditures on cash and health benefits are partial but not perfect 
substitutes.  Intergovernmental transfers for each program may take the form of matching 
or lump-sum grants.  In contrast to lump-sum grants, matching grants lower the price of 
program expenditures to taxpayers.   
This model can be used to examine the impact on state government expenditures 
of changes in matching grant rates, such as those brought about by the 1996 welfare 
reform.  The analysis shows that a reduction in matching grant support for one program 
results in an “own price effect” that leads a state to reduce spending on that program, a 
standard result in the literature.  It also shows, however, that a reduction in matching 
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spending on the other program, as well.  The magnitude of these cross-price effects 
depends on the degree of substitutability, in the preference structure of high-income 
households, between the health of the poor and their general welfare, as well as upon the 
substitutability, in the preference structure of low-income households, between health and 
other consumption.  For instance, suppose that matching grant support for state cash 
welfare expenditures is cut.  Intuitively, if both high- and low-income households view 
cash and health benefits as nearly perfect substitutes, a reduction in the matching rate for 
cash welfare will result in a large reduction in cash benefits, which are now relatively 
more costly, and a large increase in health benefits, which are now relatively cheaper and 
are “just as good” from the viewpoint of taxpayers and beneficiaries.  By contrast, low 
substitutability in taxpayer and beneficiary preferences would reduce the magnitude of 
such “cross-program substitution.”   
This analysis shows how the effects of a change in matching grant support for 
state cash welfare programs need not be confined to expenditures on those programs 
alone, but may “spill over” to programs that are “close substitutes” to cash welfare.  By 
eliminating matching grants in support of state AFDC/TANF expenditures, the 1996 
welfare reform increased the price to the states of providing cash welfare benefits to the 
poor, and by a large amount.  In all states, the marginal cost of financing an additional 
dollar of cash welfare benefits rose by at least a factor of two and, for those states that 
previously had faced the most generous matching grant support, by a factor of four.  
Since Medicaid matching grant rates were unaffected by the welfare reform, the relative 
price of providing cash and health benefits also changed in the same proportion.  For a 
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for cash welfare and health benefits, prior to welfare reform, was 0.25/0.25 = 1, whereas 
after the welfare reform, this price changed to 1/.025 = 4.  The substitution effect 
resulting from this change in relative price is equivalent to that which would be produced 
by a 75% reduction in the cost of all health care services, a very large relative price 
change over a short period of time.  Relative price changes of this magnitude could be 
expected not only to reduce state government expenditures on cash welfare but to 
increase expenditures on Medicaid, possibly substantially, if these programs are 
substitutable.  
We have begun to examine this hypothesis in some ongoing empirical research.  
As yet, we are only able to report some preliminary but suggestive findings.  Our analysis 
begins by determining the prices that states face for their expenditures on cash welfare 
(AFDC/TANF) and Medicaid, as determined by the matching grant rates for each state, 
year, and program.  We estimate the effects of these prices on the composition of state 
budgets and, in particular, on the share of each state’s budget devoted to Medicaid and 
AFDC/TANF expenditures.  The estimated own-price elasticities for these programs are 
generally negative and – of particular interest – the cross-price elasticities are generally 
positive, although the precise magnitudes of these estimates depend on the detailed 
specification of the model.  By way of illustration, in one simple specification, we 
estimate that a one percentage point increase in the “price” of Medicaid spending results 
in a decrease of -0.16 percentage points in the share of Medicaid expenditures in state 
budgets, that is, a negative own-price elasticity, while a one percentage point increase in 
  12the “price” of cash welfare results in an increase of 0.06 percentage points in the share of 
the state budget devoted to Medicaid spending, that is, a positive cross-price elasticity.  
To interpret the meaning of these estimates, note that the 1996 welfare reform 
raised the price of cash welfare expenditures by at least 50 percentage points for each 
state, and by as much as 75 percentage points for some, with a simple mean increase of 
about 60 percentage points. Given an estimated cross-price coefficient of 0.06, this would 
lead to an estimated increase in the Medicaid share of state budgets of about 0.06 x 60 = 
3.6 percentage points.  This estimate may be compared with the observed 1996-2003 
increase in the Medicaid share of state budgets from 14.0% to 17.0%, as reported in 
Table 1.  We reiterate that our estimates are provisional.  
Our preliminary results, if taken at face value, suggest that the 1996 welfare 
reform may have contributed to recent increases in Medicaid spending.  However, they 
do not imply, and we do not suggest, that the welfare reform is solely responsible for the 
changes in Medicaid spending in recent years.  On the contrary, as our earlier discussion 
emphasizes, Medicaid spending depends on many factors, all of which should be 
presumed to play a role in the growth of expenditures over time.  The potential spillover 
effects between cash welfare and Medicaid spending that we have identified are only one 
part of the extremely complex regulatory and fiscal interactions between the state and 
Federal governments.  Additionally, a host of other demographic, technological, political, 
and economic factors have played a large role in the evolution of Medicaid spending.  
This is a topic that warrants and will no doubt receive considerable attention in future 
research.   
 
  13IV. Policy Options and Prospects 
States continuously re-examine budgetary priorities in the face of changing 
circumstances.  Medicaid is now such a large element in state budgets that large fiscal 
consequences will flow from continued growth or possible retrenchment.  Furthermore, 
Federal Medicaid assistance to the states has become a mainstay of state revenue systems.  
Significant changes in the level or type of assistance to the states offered through 
Medicaid would have potentially quite large impacts on revenues and on the 
intergovernmental fiscal system.  In this section, we discuss what Medicaid-related 
changes may be in store for state finances and intergovernmental transfers in the future.   
Of course, predicting “turning points” in fiscal policy – moments when spending 
program or tax policies break with past practice and start on what appears in retrospect to 
be significant new paths – is as difficult as predicting macroeconomic turning points, to 
which, incidentally, they may or may not be related.  As McGuire and Merriman (2006) 
observe, cyclical shocks sometimes do, and sometimes do not, appear to affect different 
components of state fiscal policies.   In fact, their analysis suggests that social welfare 
expenditures are, if anything, somewhat immune to cyclical shocks.  To paraphrase 
Herbert Stein, however, unsustainable trends will not be sustained.  Medicaid spending 
growth is bound to stop short of the point where it consumes 100% of state budgets.   
This simple observation is worth bearing in mind as we discuss some of the demographic 
trends that are relevant for Medicaid.   Growing incentives for fiscal adjustment are likely 
to bring about one or more of several possible significant changes in Medicaid policy, 
and thus in state finances, the intergovernmental fiscal system, and the nation’s health 
care system.   
  14A.  Demographics 
The elderly account for a very large share of all medical expenditures and a very 
large share of current Medicaid spending in particular.  As noted in the Economic Report 
of the President (2007, p. 95), “the elderly and disabled covered by Medicare account for 
about one-quarter of Medicaid enrollees, but they account for about two-thirds of 
Medicaid spending,” an observation that also highlights the fact that a large portion of 
health care spending for the elderly is presently allocated through the Medicaid program 
rather than through Medicare.  In 2003, Medicaid payments for aged beneficiaries were 
approximately $13,677, compared to an average of $4,487 for all beneficiaries, and only 
$1,606 for children (CMS, 2006).  The national old-age dependency ratio is expected to 
rise from its current value of 0.20 to 0.31 in 2025, 0.38 in 2050, and 0.41 by 2075 (Board 
of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust Funds (2006, p. 78)). A 50% increase in the 
relative size of the aged population by 2025 and a doubling by 2075 portend rapid and 
large increases in the demand for health care and corresponding upward pressure on 
Medicaid spending, at least in the absence of significant reforms. 
As important as the total size of the elderly population is its distribution among 
the states.  As of 2005, the old-age dependency ratio varied from a low in Alaska of 0.10 
to a high of 0.28 in Florida.  According to Census estimates, this ratio is expected to 
range from 0.22 (Utah) to 0.44 (Florida) in 2025, having increased in all states (US 
Census, 2007).  At that time, the dependency ratio is expected to be lower than Florida’s 
2005 value of 0.28 in ten states (Alaska among them) but to exceed 0.40 in seven states.  
The projected rate of increase varies from less than 50% in six states to more than 90% in 
  15five states (and more than 100% in three).  State Medicaid budgets are thus likely to be 
affected quite unevenly by population aging.  
Immigration, an important determinant of population size and composition, can 
have significant impacts on state (and Federal) expenditures and revenues.  The rate of 
immigration is expected to be almost as large as the rate of natural increase of the 
population in coming decades (see, e.g., OASDI Trustees (p. 76)), and the foreign-born 
population will rise well beyond the current 12.4% share of the US population. 
Immigration impacts differ dramatically by state: the population share of the foreign born 
ranges from less than 5% in 20 states to a high of 27.2% in California (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2005a).  On average, recent immigrants are relatively young and have high 
fertility rates, dampening the shift toward an older age structure.  On the other hand, 
many immigrants are poorly educated and have low earnings; these immigrants are 
disproportionately low contributors to state and Federal fiscal systems and impose 
significant fiscal burdens, illustrated by the fact that about 18% of participants in the 
Food Stamp, AFDC/TANF, and Medicaid programs are non-natives.
4  The Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 attempts to address this issue by holding states responsible, for the 
first time, for Medicaid expenditures for individuals who claim to be US citizens but are 
unable to provide documentation supporting their citizenship and identity.   
International migration in the US is dwarfed in magnitude by internal migration.  
Between 1995 and 2000, about 20% of the US population – both elderly and young -- 
moved from one state to another.  High lifetime mobility explains the fact that only 60% 
                                                 
4 We are grateful to C. Bollinger (private communication) for providing these figures.  See Wildasin 
(2006a, b) for further discussion of the fiscal impacts of migration and immigration.  This is an issue of 
global importance, as all developed nations grapple simultaneously with aging populations and rising 
immigration, especially from less-developed countries.    
  16of the US population resided in their state of birth in 2000 --  a figure that was under 40% 
for five states (Nevada was lowest, at 21.3%, followed by Florida, at 32.7%) but that 
exceeded 75% in three states (Louisiana was the highest, at 79.4%) (US Census, 2005b).  
In summary, the states do now and are expected in the future to vary widely along 
demographic dimensions that are important for health care and, more particularly, for 
state government Medicaid spending.  In the absence of policy reforms, immigration and 
the aging of the population are likely to impose rapidly increasing health care costs on 
state governments, but the distribution of these among the states will be far from uniform.  
We return below to some of the potential fiscal implications of interstate migration.   
 
B.  Intergovernmental Coordination of Health Policy: Medicare, Part D 
The provision of Medicaid assistance to the states is only one aspect of the 
Federal government’s involvement in the nation’s health care system, and is by no means 
the largest in budgetary terms.  The Federal government spent $330 billion in 2006 to 
provide benefits for more than 42 million Medicare beneficiaries, accounting for about 
12% of the Federal budget, as compared to Federal Medicaid spending of $191 billion. 
(Economic Report of the President (2007, p. 86))  For many elderly and disabled 
beneficiaries, health care costs are divided between these two programs, and changes in 
Medicare policy inevitably interact with the Medicaid system, as illustrated by the recent 
expansion of Federal government responsibility for the costs of prescription drugs, 
principally through Medicare Part D.  
This reform has potentially far-reaching implications for Medicaid, which has 
experienced rapid growth in prescription drug expenditures in recent years.  For the aged, 
  17Medicaid drug costs per beneficiary doubled in real terms between1996 and 2003, from 
$1,256 ($2003 dollars) in 1996 to $2,514 in 2003, accounting for 12.0% of Medicaid 
spending per aged beneficiary in 1996 but rising to 18.4% by 2003 (CMS, 2006). The 
new Medicare benefit may relieve the states of some of this burden, as elderly 
beneficiaries obtain coverage from Medicare Part D instead of Medicaid.
5  The states are 
still in the initial stages of adapting to this new Medicare program, but the potential 
expenditure impact on the states is substantial, particularly over a horizon one or two 
decades, as compared with the trajectory that might otherwise occur given the rapid aging 
of the population.  This will particularly be true if large numbers of beneficiaries, perhaps 
with state government encouragement, transition from Medicaid to Medicare for drug 
coverage. 
The prescription drug benefit is only one of many possible changes in Federal 
health care policy that may affect Medicaid spending in future years.  While the recent 
establishment of the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefits may offer significant 
fiscal relief for state Medicaid systems, other policy reforms may shift financial burdens 
to the states.   
                                                 
5 In the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services publication “Medicare & You 2007,” Medicare 
recipients are informed that (p. 49) if they receive full drug coverage from their state Medicaid program 
and are eligible for Medicare, then Medicare will automatically enroll them in Medicare prescription drug 
coverage if they have not already chosen to do so.  Therefore, Medicare, not Medicaid will provide their 
drug coverage.  Placing the primary financial burden of dually-eligible recipients on the Medicare program 
is not unusual.  States often pay the Medicare Part B premium on behalf of their dually eligible citizens so 
that Medicare becomes the primary insurer of physician services, rather than the state Medicaid program.  
According to Phelps (1997, p. 453) states covered the part B premium for 75% of their dually eligible 
elderly citizens and 20% of their dually eligible permanently disabled citizens. 
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C.   Medicaid Reform and the “Assignment Problem” 
In this subsection, we consider the potential for Medicaid reform from a 
federalism perspective, recognizing that both the Federal and state governments face 
pressures for reform that will surely increase over time.  Any major reform of Medicaid is 
likely to redraw the boundaries of Federal and state responsibilities for health care.  In the 
literature of federalism, the division of responsibilities among different levels of 
government is known as the “assignment problem” (see, e.g., Oates (1972)).  A persistent 
theme in this literature suggests that responsibility for redistributive policy belongs at the 
national level.  On the other hand, sub-national governments should play a prominent role 
in the provision of public goods for which the benefits and costs vary in accordance with 
local conditions about which these governments are better informed.  Intergovernmental 
transfers from higher- to lower-level governments are often seen either as a form of 
generalized assistance or as a means by which the higher-level government can influence 
the allocative decisions of recipient governments, especially to take spillover effects into 
account.  The evolution of policy responsibilities in a federation can be viewed as a 
reflection of a shifting balance among these sometimes conflicting considerations. 
In the US, the Federal government does assume a leading role in financing cash 
and in-kind redistributive transfers.  For the elderly, the Social Security system and 
Medicare, both entirely Federal programs, are the two major sources of cash and health 
care benefits.  Other Federal-only policies provide cash or near-cash benefits targeted at 
the poor, including the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Food Stamp programs 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).  The budgetary costs of these programs fall on 
  19the Federal government, either through increased outlays or through foregone tax 
revenues (tax expenditures).  However, as exemplified by Medicaid, AFDC/TANF, and 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), redistributive policy in the US 
federation has long involved the state governments as well, although in ever-changing 
proportions.
6  The recent introduction of prescription drug benefits in Medicare Part D is 
one more step in this evolution, an “upward reassignment” that consolidates more of the 
responsibility for health care for the elderly in the hands of the Federal government. 
The timing and nature of future major reforms of Medicaid, of related health 
programs such as Medicare, or of related cash or in-kind programs of assistance to the 
poor such as TANF, SSI, Food Stamps, or the EITC, cannot be known.  However, the 
Federal government is entering a multi-decade period of fiscal stress, driven largely by 
the demographic trends discussed earlier.
7   There will be strong incentives to limit 
expenditure growth under these conditions, and the amount and form of Federal Medicaid 
assistance to the states is certain to face close scrutiny.  Because Federal grant support for 
AFDC and Medicaid were so similar in structure prior to the 1996 welfare reform, and 
because this reform was followed by significant reductions in welfare expenditures, a 
similar reform of Federal Medicaid assistance to the states is one policy option that will 
surely attract attention.  Indeed, as discussed by Lambrew (2005), Medicaid reforms of 
                                                 
6 Prior to the Great Depression, cash assistance to the poor was mainly a state and local function.  Indeed, 
the tradition of local involvement in assistance to the poor goes back much further, as described, for 
instance, in Brown and Oates (1987).  Wallis (1984) discusses the beginnings of Federal government 
participation in poverty relief during the Depression.  Aid to Dependent Children, the forerunner of AFDC 
and finally TANF, began at this time.  
7 Unfunded liabilities for Social Security and Medicare over a 75-year horizon are estimated to be more 
than $15 trillion of current GDP, larger than the current Federal debt of $8.8 trillion.  See Board of Trustees 
of  the Federal Hospital Insurance … ( 2006, p. 61) and Board of Trustees of the Federal OASDI Trust 
Funds (2006, p. 56). 
  20this type have previously been proposed, by President Reagan in 1981, Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich in 1995, and President Bush in 2003.     
In hindsight,  the fact that a number of states had applied for and received 
administrative waivers prior to 1996, enabling them to experiment with significant 
welfare reforms, was an early indicator of major changes to come.  Indeed, some of those 
experiments served as models for the 1996 reform.  For instance, in one widely-cited 
case, Wisconsin was permitted to introduce training and work requirements as a 
condition for the receipt of welfare benefits.  The 1996 welfare reform codified this trend 
toward increased policy autonomy for all states, contributing to significant changes in 
welfare administration in many states that continues today.  Coupled with a shift toward 
lump-sum grants, the1996 reform effectively resulted in a significant “downward 
reassignment” of regulatory and “marginal” financial responsibility for cash welfare 
benefits for the poor.  This reassignment allows the states to adapt policy to local 
conditions, even as it shifts an important element of redistributive policy away from the 
national government.
8 
Whether an early indicator of major Medicaid reform or not, a number of states 
have been granted waivers enabling them to experiment with their Medicaid systems, 
showing that policy experimentation continues in the “laboratory of the states.”  The 
National Conference of State Legislatures (2007) provides information on recently 
approved “1115” Medicaid waivers in eleven states, as well as proposals being circulated 
                                                 
8 Some states have used the flexibility afforded by TANF to decentralize important aspects of welfare 
policy to local governments, a “second generation devolution” of the welfare system.  See Fording 
(forthcoming) for discussion of Florida's post-TANF decentralization of many aspects of TANF 
implementation to county-level bodies. Florida now contracts out significant welfare-administration tasks 
to private-sector firms.  Interstate variation in TANF policy presumably reflects local benefit and cost 
variations. 
  21in ten other states.  In Kentucky, for example, CMS recently approved the “KYHealth 
Choices” waiver, which restructures the standard Medicaid benefit package into four 
distinct plans tailored towards different types of enrollees (the general population, 
children, elderly and beneficiaries with disabilities or mental retardation) and increases 
cost sharing for enrollees on an income-based sliding fee scale.
9 
Reforms being implemented or considered in other states include making risk-
adjusted premiums available to enrollees to purchase private insurance plans (Florida and 
South Carolina) and the provision of personal health savings accounts (multiple states) to 
purchase health related products and services.  Some states (Vermont and Georgia) have 
even proposed conversion of their Federal matching grant to a block grant (thus 
providing more cost certainty to the Federal government) in return for greater state 
control of the administration and structure of their programs.
10  The fact that state 
Medicaid waiver proposals differ widely may be an indication that local benefit and cost 
conditions do vary from one state to another and that there may be efficiency gains from 
decentralization of Medicaid policy. 
Perhaps another leading indicator of future changes in state Medicaid programs 
has been the evolution of and the current reauthorization debate surrounding the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).  SCHIP was created by the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 under Title XXI of the Social Security Act.  The purpose of the 
program is to expand health coverage for low income, uninsured children that are not 
income eligible for Medicaid.   
                                                 
9 Two studies that examine the impact of increased cost sharing in public insurance programs are Kenney et 
al. (2007) and Marton (2007). 
10 Vermont received Federal approval for its proposal and was scheduled to begin a five year demonstration 
of this new financing arrangement in 2006.  
  22The structure and the financing of the SCHIP program were no doubt influenced 
by the political climate during which it was created.  Like TANF, SCHIP provides states 
a great deal of flexibility in terms of the generosity and structure of their programs.  
States were able to choose whether or not to create a new program to cover children, 
expand their existing Medicaid program, or some combination of the two.
11  In order to 
give states a financial incentive to take advantage of this new program, the Federal 
government offered states matching rates on SCHIP expenditures that are more generous 
than the standard Medicaid matching rates.  Unlike the Medicaid program, Federal funds 
allocated to each state for their SCHIP program are capped annually, though states can 
roll over any unused balances into the future.
12 
As SCHIP moves towards its 10 year anniversary, it is coming up for 
reauthorization.  Many states have balanced their SCHIP budget in recent years by using 
unspent funding from previous years but are now exhausting these funds and face the full 
cost of additional expenditures.  Some states are adjusting by freezing SCHIP 
enrollments or are considering the scaling back of income eligibility thresholds.  States 
are lobbying for increased support from the Federal government under the reauthorization 
in the form of more generous annual allotments.  In an effort to control costs, the Bush 
administration has proposed holding the allotments at their current levels and restricting 
some of the program’s flexibility by limiting coverage to children in families with 
                                                 
11 Some policymakers were initially concerned that such state flexibility may give rise to “substandard” 
care.  Today others are concerned that states have pushed this flexibility “too far” by increasing the income 
eligibility ceiling too high in their state or enrolling parents as a means to attract more children to their 
program.  
12 A state’s annual allocation is a function of the number of children in families with incomes below 200% 
of the Federal Poverty Level and the number of uninsured children in families with income below 200% of 
the Federal Poverty Level. 
  23income up to 200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).
13  The resolution of this debate 
may provide insight into the sorts of issues that could arise should Medicaid financing be 
reformed in a similar way.
14    
A reform of Medicaid financing that (like the 1996 welfare reform) replaces the 
current system of open-ended matching grants with lump-sum grants similar to those 
introduced under TANF, coupled with further regulatory liberalization, would result in a 
substantial “downward reassignment” of responsibility for the provision of health care for 
the poor.  By raising the cost of Medicaid spending by at least a factor of two for all 
states, and much more than this for some, such a reform would create powerful new 
incentives for states to limit Medicaid expenditures.  Such a reform would still leave the 
financing of health care benefits for the elderly largely in the hands of the Federal 
government.   
Federal government assumption of responsibility for the costs of health care for 
the elderly protects state governments from the fiscal disparities that arise from the 
uneven interstate distribution of the elderly described above.  Open-ended matching 
grants do the same, to a substantial degree, but they also change the relative price of 
health care spending for the states in ways that encourage high expenditures.  For this 
reason, an “upward reassignment” of financial responsibilities for the health care of the 
aged may represent a superior policy outcome.   
To conclude, we note that there remain two potential sources of significant fiscal 
externalities associated with state government spending on health care for the non-elderly 
poor.  Both are related to the fact that health care costs are concentrated near the end of 
                                                 
13 Some states have used the flexibility afforded to them under SCHIP to enroll parents as well as children 
and /or extend the income eligibility ceiling above 200% FPL. 
14 For more on SCHIP reauthorization, see Kenney and Yee (2007). 
  24life and to the high lifetime mobility of the US population.  Some health care 
expenditures for the young, including children, produce benefits throughout life.  The 
high mobility of the US population implies that a substantial share of the later-in-life 
benefits of health care costs incurred on behalf of a state’s younger residents will accrue 
to future residents of other states, that is, a large portion of the long-term benefits of 
health care spending spill across state boundaries.  This is a “horizontal” fiscal 
externality.  In a federal system in which the Federal government bears a large share of 
the cost of health for the elderly, there are also “vertical” fiscal externalities associated 
with state-level medical interventions for the young.  Such interventions -- programs for 
children or younger adults that preserve cardiovascular fitness, for instance -- will reduce 
Federal government health care costs in later years.   
To our knowledge, these horizontal and fiscal externalities have not previously 
been studied, but they appear to warrant further investigation.  If they give rise to 
significant horizontal or vertical spillovers, complete decentralization of the 
responsibility for the health care costs of the non-elderly poor may result in inefficiently 
low state government health care spending.  Matching grants might be used to 
“internalize” these externalities, the magnitudes of which would depend upon the effect 
of early-in-life state government health interventions on subsequent health care costs 
covered by the Federal and other state governments.  More precisely, the external benefit 
from a particular health intervention could be estimated by calculating the present value 
of future health care cost savings at the Federal level and for other state governments.  
The latter amount would depend on the estimated probability of migration.  Creating 
fiscal incentives for state governments to take these spillover effects into account could 
  25encourage them to direct their health care spending in ways that benefit the broader 
society.  There is little reason to presume that the current system of matching grants with 
matching rates inversely dependent on per capita income internalize these spillovers 
effectively.  Furthermore, spillover effects are greatest for early-in-life interventions that 
produce later-in-life health benefits, a fact that should be reflected in a well-designed 
system of fiscal incentives to internalize these external effects.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Due to its rapid growth in recent years, Medicaid has become one of the major 
components of state government budgets.  Perhaps ominously, there is little prospect that 
spending pressures will diminish in the foreseeable future.  On the contrary, powerful 
demographic forces are likely to stimulate demand for still higher Medicaid expenditures.  
Continued growth in a program that already accounts for a large share of state 
government spending may impose significant stress on state fiscal systems.  It is true that 
the current system of matching grants relieves states from much of the financial burden 
that Medicaid spending would otherwise impose; these costs are instead absorbed by the 
Federal government.  But this cost shifting may stimulate Federal interest in policy 
reforms that limit future expenditure growth.  
Major Medicaid reforms are likely to involve some change in the 
intergovernmental fiscal and regulatory relations that now underpin the program.  
Already, many states are seeking waivers that allow them to experiment with 
programmatic modifications.  Similar developments preceded the welfare reform of 1996 
which, as we have emphasized, led to a fundamental restructuring of Federal government 
  26financial support for, and oversight of, the system of cash welfare benefits provided to the 
poor.  Parallel reforms for Medicaid have been proposed.   Such reforms have potentially 
far-reaching effects on subnational governments.  Our earlier theoretical analysis 
highlights the possibility that the welfare reform may have encouraged states to shift their 
redistributive transfers to the poor toward health care benefits and away from cash 
welfare, and our preliminary empirical research finds some tentative support for this 
hypothesis.  A major reform of Medicaid – which, by now, is of far greater budgetary 
importance to the states than AFDC/TANF spending ever was – would affect all aspects 
of state government finances, both on the expenditure and on the revenue sides.  
Prospective policy reforms could profit from additional analytical effort devoted to 
understanding what some of these effects might be.  
Determining the appropriate roles of the state and Federal governments in health 
care policy is a difficult and complex task.  We have identified some but certainly not all 
of the issues that need to be taken into account in determining what each level of 
government is best able to do and how their policies should be mutually-adapted.  
Students of fiscal federalism and of health policy alike can and should contribute much to 
ongoing and future policy debates regarding Medicaid and the broader health care policy 
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Table 1A 


















Year  millions of $  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
 








Medicaid Budget Share / 
Cash Welfare Budget Share 
1988 484,667  48,217  9.95% 16,677 3.44%  2.89 
1989 525,077  54,110  10.31% 17,310  3.30%  3.13 
1990 572,318  64,463  11.26% 18,906  3.30%  3.41 
1991 628,836  76,452  12.16% 20,744  3.30%  3.69 
1992 701,601  90,152  12.85% 21,915  3.12%  4.11 
1993 743,244  100,992  13.59% 22,481  3.02%  4.49 
1994 779,459  107,479  13.79% 22,582  2.90%  4.76 
1995 836,894  119,353  14.26% 21,821  2.61%  5.47 
1996 859,599  120,709  14.04% 20,208  2.35%  5.97 
1997 893,393  123,476  13.82% 18,928  2.12%  6.52 
1998 930,037  141,327  15.20% 21,881  2.35%  6.46 
1999 998,365  146,614  14.69% 22,992  2.30%  6.38 
2000 1,084,097  167,650  15.46% 24,624  2.27%  6.81 
2001 1,185,260  186,083  15.70% 25,500  2.15%  7.30 
2002 1,282,852  212,460  16.56% 25,205  1.96%  8.43 
2003 1,359,048  232,006  17.07% 26,161  1.92%  8.87 
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AL 18,471  3,471  18.79% 171  0.92%  20.34  70.60 
AK 8,122  836  10.29%  88  1.09% 9.48  58.27 
AZ 19,606  3,285  16.76% 342  1.74%  9.62  67.25 
AR 12,085  2,212  18.30% 54  0.45% 40.78  74.28 
CA 204,438  25,812  12.63% 5,851  2.86%  4.41  50.00 
CO 17,691  2,269  12.82% 236  1.34%  9.61  50.00 
CT 20,721  3,359  16.21% 450  2.17%  7.47  50.00 
DE 4,858  750  15.44%  56 1.16% 13.29  50.00 
FL 56,317  11,104  19.72% 852  1.51%  13.03  58.83 
GA 32,527  5,358  16.47% 501  1.54%  10.70  59.60 
HI 7,611  753  9.90%  134 1.76%  5.62  58.77 
  31ID 5,415  867  16.01%  43 0.80% 20.10  70.96 
IL 51,291  9,391  18.31% 989  1.93%  9.49  50.00 
IN 23,090  3,951  17.11% 313  1.36%  12.61  61.97 
IA 13,088  1,996  15.25% 156  1.19%  12.79  63.50 
KS 10,954  1,615  14.74%  150 1.37% 10.76  60.15 
KY 19,117  3,558  18.61%  191 1.00% 18.62  69.89 
LA 18,681  3,615  19.35% 267  1.43%  13.53  71.28 
ME 6,706  2,074  30.93%  100 1.49% 20.74  66.22 
MD 24,592  4,398  17.88% 366  1.49%  12.02  50.00 
MA 32,710  6,392  19.54% 697  2.13%  9.18  50.00 
MI 51,016  6,479  12.70%  1,205 2.36%  5.38  55.42 
MN 28,899  4,702  16.27% 498  1.72%  9.45  50.00 
MS 13,503  2,570  19.03% 120  0.89%  21.41  76.62 
MO 21,566  4,407  20.43% 299  1.38%  14.76  61.23 
MT 4,437  536  12.09%  56 1.26% 9.63  72.96 
NE 6,824  1,283  18.80%  79 1.16% 16.25  59.52 
NV 7,816  881  11.28%  85 1.09% 10.39  52.39 
NH 5,276  786  14.90%  72  1.37% 10.85  50.00 
NJ 44,948  6,030  13.41% 842  1.87%  7.16  50.00 
NM 10,673  2,033  19.05% 123  1.15%  16.53  74.56 
NY 127,475  35,207  27.62% 4,463  3.50%  7.89  50.00 
NC 34,361  6,521  18.98%  457 1.33% 14.28  62.56 
ND 3,121  445  14.25%  42  1.34% 10.61  68.36 
OH 56,392  10,235  18.15% 1,007  1.79%  10.17  58.83 
OK 15,125  2,129  14.07% 203  1.34%  10.48  70.56 
OR 18,006  2,116  11.75% 226  1.25%  9.38  60.16 
PA 57,428  9,450  16.46%  1,109 1.93%  8.53  54.69 
RI 5,977  1,338  22.39%  162 2.72%  8.24  55.40 
SC 21,040  3,642  17.31% 148  0.71%  24.53  69.81 
SD 2,898  542  18.70%  26 0.91% 20.46  65.29 
TN 21,022  5,459  25.97% 274  1.30%  19.90  64.59 
TX 76,386  12,525  16.40% 898  1.18%  13.95  59.99 
UT 10,252  1,201  11.71% 131  1.28%  9.18  71.24 
VT 3,859  642  16.63%  67 1.73% 9.63  62.41 
VA 29,129  3,181  10.92%  273 0.94% 11.64  50.53 
WA 32,600  4,524  13.88% 572  1.75%  7.91  50.00 
WV 10,004  1,830  18.29% 157  1.57%  11.67  75.04 
WI 27,658  3,921  14.18% 489  1.77%  8.02  58.43 
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Year  millions of $ 
 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend 
1988  27,023  5.58% 9,125 1.88% 21,194  4.37% 7,552  1.56% 
1989  30,447  5.80% 9,460 1.80% 23,663  4.51% 7,850  1.50% 
1990  36,437  6.37% 10,330 1.80% 28,026  4.90% 8,576  1.50% 
1991  43,374  6.90% 11,345 1.80% 33,078  5.26% 9,398  1.49% 
1992  51,821  7.39% 12,074 1.72% 38,331  5.46% 9,842  1.40% 
1993  58,138  7.82% 12,371 1.66% 42,854  5.77% 10,110 1.36% 
1994  61,543  7.90% 12,376 1.59% 45,936  5.89% 10,206 1.31% 
1995  67,954  8.12% 11,886 1.42% 51,399  6.14% 9,935  1.19% 
1996  68,459  7.96% 10,939 1.27% 52,250  6.08% 9,270  1.08% 
1997  69,908  7.82% 10,005 1.12% 53,568  6.00% 8,924  1.00% 
1998  79,690  8.57% 11,273 1.21% 61,637  6.63% 10,608 1.14% 
1999  82,719  8.29% 12,292 1.23% 63,895  6.40% 10,699 1.07% 
2000  95,124  8.77% 13,302 1.23% 72,526  6.69% 11,321 1.04% 
2001  105,834  8.93% 14,868 1.25% 80,250  6.77% 10,632 0.90% 
2002  120,334  9.38% 14,456 1.13% 92,126  7.18% 10,750 0.84% 
2003  131,651  9.69% 16,163 1.19% 100,355  7.38% 10,011  0.74% 
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State  millions of $ 
 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend  millions of $ 
% of State 
Total 
Expend 
AL 2,451 13.27%  131  0.71% 1,021  5.53%  39  0.21% 
AK  487  5.99% 44 0.55%  349  4.29%  44  0.54% 
AZ 2,209 11.27%  260  1.33% 1,076  5.49%  81  0.41% 
AR 1,643 13.60%  32  0.26% 569  4.71% 22  0.18% 
CA  12,906  6.31% 3,671 1.80% 12,906  6.31% 2,181  1.07% 
CO 1,134  6.41%  111  0.62% 1,134  6.41%  126  0.71% 
CT 1,680  8.11%  255  1.23% 1,680  8.11%  195  0.94% 
DE  375  7.72% 28 0.57%  375  7.72%  29  0.59% 
FL 6,533 11.60%  484  0.86% 4,572  8.12%  368  0.65% 
GA 3,193  9.82%  326  1.00% 2,164  6.65%  174  0.54% 
HI  443  5.82% 58 0.76% 311  4.08% 77  1.01% 
ID 615 11.36%  30  0.56%  252  4.65%  13  0.24% 
  33IL 4,696 9.15%  565  1.10% 4,696  9.15%  425  0.83% 
IN 2,448 10.60%  200  0.87% 1,502  6.51%  114  0.49% 
IA  1,268  9.69% 94 0.72% 729  5.57% 62  0.47% 
KS  971  8.87% 82 0.75%  643  5.87%  68  0.62% 
KY 2,487 13.01%  119  0.62%  1,071 5.60% 72  0.38% 
LA 2,577 13.79%  228  1.22% 1,038  5.56%  40  0.21% 
ME 1,374  20.48%  55  0.82% 701 10.45% 45  0.67% 
MD 2,199  8.94%  183  0.74% 2,199  8.94%  183  0.74% 
MA 3,196  9.77%  338  1.03% 3,196  9.77%  359  1.10% 
MI 3,591  7.04%  736  1.44% 2,888  5.66%  469  0.92% 
MN 2,351  8.13%  317  1.10% 2,351  8.13%  180  0.62% 
MS 1,969  14.58%  98  0.73% 601  4.45% 22  0.16% 
MO 2,698  12.51%  170  0.79% 1,709  7.92%  128  0.59% 
MT  391  8.82% 41 0.92%  145  3.27%  15  0.33% 
NE 763 11.19%  50  0.73%  519  7.61%  29  0.42% 
NV  462  5.91% 58 0.74%  420  5.37%  27  0.35% 
NH  393  7.45% 40 0.76%  393  7.45%  32  0.61% 
NJ 3,015  6.71%  444  0.99% 3,015  6.71%  397  0.88% 
NM 1,516  14.21%  90  0.85% 517  4.85% 33  0.31% 
NY 17,603 13.81%  2,783  2.18% 17,603 13.81% 1,680  1.32% 
NC 4,080 11.87%  252  0.73%  2,442 7.11% 205 0.60% 
ND  304  9.74% 33 1.05%  141  4.51%  9  0.29% 
OH 6,021  10.68%  614  1.09% 4,214  7.47%  393  0.70% 
OK 1,502  9.93%  142  0.94% 627  4.14% 61  0.40% 
OR 1,273  7.07%  155  0.86% 843  4.68% 70  0.39% 
PA 5,168  9.00%  701  1.22%  4,282 7.46% 407 0.71% 
RI 741 12.40%  86  1.44% 597  9.99% 76  1.28% 
SC 2,542 12.08%  113  0.53% 1,099  5.23%  36  0.17% 
SD 354 12.21%  18  0.62%  188  6.49%  9  0.30% 
TN 3,526 16.77%  186  0.88% 1,933  9.20%  88  0.42% 
TX 7,513  9.84%  664  0.87% 5,011  6.56%  247  0.32% 
UT 855  8.34%  106  1.03%  345  3.37%  25  0.24% 
VT 401 10.38%  35  0.90%  241  6.25%  32  0.83% 
VA 1,607  5.52%  145  0.50%  1,574 5.40% 128 0.44% 
WA 2,262  6.94%  307  0.94% 2,262  6.94%  264  0.81% 
WV 1,373  13.73%  122  1.22% 457  4.57% 34  0.34% 
WI 2,291  8.28%  321  1.16% 1,630  5.89%  168  0.61% 










  34Table 3A 
Federal Government Medicaid and Cash Welfare Expenditures as a Share of State 




State Intergovernmental Revenue 
(3) 
 
Federal Spending on Medicaid 
(4) 
 





Year  millions of $  % of State Total Expend  millions of $ 
 
% of State IG Rev  millions of $  % of State IG Rev 
1988 107,241  22.13%  27,023 25.20%  9,125  8.51% 
1989 115,765  22.05%  30,447 26.30%  9,460  8.17% 
1990 126,329  22.07%  36,437 28.84%  10,330  8.18% 
1991 143,534  22.83%  43,374 30.22%  11,345  7.90% 
1992 169,928  24.22%  51,821 30.50%  12,074  7.11% 
1993 188,256  25.33%  58,138 30.88%  12,371  6.57% 
1994 204,518  26.24%  61,543 30.09%  12,376  6.05% 
1995 215,558  25.76%  67,954 31.52%  11,886  5.51% 
1996 221,369  25.75%  68,459 30.93%  10,939  4.94% 
1997 230,859  25.84%  69,908 30.28%  10,005  4.33% 
1998 240,789  25.89%  79,690 33.10%  11,273  4.68% 
1999 253,692  25.41%  82,719 32.61%  12,292  4.85% 
2000 274,382  25.31%  95,124 34.67%  13,302  4.85% 
2001 305,621  25.79%  105,834 34.63%  14,868  4.86% 
2002 335,434  26.15%  120,334 35.87%  14,456  4.31% 
2003 361,617  26.61%  131,651 36.41%  16,163  4.47% 
 
Table 3B 
Federal Government Medicaid and Cash Welfare Expenditures as a Share of State 




State Intergovernmental Revenue 
(3) 
 
Federal Spending on Medicaid 
(4) 
 





Year  millions of $  % of State Total Expend  millions of $ 
 
% of State IG Rev  millions of $  % of State IG Rev 
AL 6,669  36.10%  2,451 36.75%  131  1.97% 
AK 1,997  24.59%  487  24.38%  44  2.22% 
AZ 6,093  31.07%  2,209 36.26%  260  4.27% 
AR 3,685  30.49%  1,643 44.58%  32  0.87% 
CA 48,246  23.60%  12,906 26.75%  3,671  7.61% 
CO 4,179  23.62%  1,134 27.15%  111  2.64% 
CT 4,020  19.40%  1,680 41.78%  255  6.34% 
DE 995  20.48%  375  37.70%  28  2.79% 
FL 12,851  22.82%  6,533 50.83%  484  3.76% 
GA 9,028  27.76%  3,193 35.37%  326  3.61% 
HI 1,538  20.21%  443  28.79% 58  3.74% 
ID 1,456  26.88%  615  42.27%  30  2.07% 
IL 12,027  23.45%  4,696 39.04%  565  4.69% 
IN 6,347  27.49%  2,448 38.58%  200  3.15% 
IA 3,534  27.00%  1,268 35.86%  94  2.66% 
KS 3,267  29.82%  971  29.73%  82  2.50% 
  35KY 5,330  27.88%  2,487  46.65% 119  2.24% 
LA 6,502  34.80%  2,577 39.63%  228  3.50% 
ME 2,063  30.76%  1,374 66.60%  55  2.67% 
MD 5,830  23.71%  2,199 37.72%  183  3.14% 
MA 5,130  15.68%  3,196 62.30%  338  6.58% 
MI 12,222  23.96%  3,591 29.38%  736  6.02% 
MN 5,982  20.70%  2,351 39.30%  317  5.30% 
MS 5,086  37.67%  1,969 38.71%  98  1.93% 
MO 7,173  33.26%  2,698 37.62%  170  2.38% 
MT 1,583  35.67%  391  24.73%  41  2.58% 
NE 2,140  31.36%  763  35.68%  50  2.34% 
NV 1,498  19.16%  462  30.82%  58  3.85% 
NH 1,464  27.75%  393  26.84%  40  2.74% 
NJ 9,065  20.17%  3,015 33.26%  444  4.90% 
NM 3,221  30.18%  1,516 47.07%  90  2.81% 
NY 43,442  34.08%  17,603 40.52%  2,783  6.41% 
NC 10,279  29.91%  4,080 39.69%  252  2.45% 
ND 1,128  36.14%  304  26.96%  33  2.91% 
OH 14,058  24.93%  6,021 42.83%  614  4.37% 
OK 4,255  28.13%  1,502 35.30%  142  3.34% 
OR 4,216  23.41%  1,273 30.19%  155  3.68% 
PA 14,467  25.19%  5,168 35.72%  701  4.85% 
RI 1,855  31.04%  741  39.96% 86  4.63% 
SC 5,739  27.28%  2,542 44.30%  113  1.96% 
SD 1,111  38.35%  354  31.83%  18  1.61% 
TN 8,292  39.45%  3,526 42.52%  186  2.24% 
TX 24,350  31.88%  7,513 30.86%  664  2.73% 
UT 2,494  24.32%  855  34.31%  106  4.25% 
VT 1,152  29.86%  401  34.76%  35  3.01% 
VA 5,679  19.50%  1,607  28.30% 145  2.56% 
WA 7,012  21.51%  2,262 32.26%  307  4.38% 
WV 2,975  29.74%  1,373 46.15%  122  4.11% 
WI 7,094  25.65%  2,291 32.30%  321  4.52% 
WY 1,798  55.08%  199  11.07%  42  2.33% 
 
  36Figure 1: Annual Medicaid Expenditures as a Share of 














































































Figure 2: Annual Cash Welfare Expenditures as a Share of 















































































  37Figure 3: Ratio of the Annual State Medicaid 
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